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Abstract Bioethics case reports generally treat aspects
of moral fathomability, characterised and addressed in
different ways. This paper reads the case as a textual
model of scenarios and draws attention to its structure,
narrative shape, linguistic register, and the effects of
tone and temporality on reader expectation and respon-
siveness. Such textual elements of case composition
reflect authorial purpose and influence the interpreta-
tion, including moral and ethical interpretation, of bio-
ethics cases.
Keywords Case . Narrative . Bioethics .
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The most interesting parts of the moral world
have to be “read,” rendered, construed, glossed,
elucidated, and not merely described (Walzer
1987, 29).
Ethical issues in health care have been represented
and explored in a multiplicity of forms, including nov-
els, dramas, short stories, memoirs, vignettes, and case
reports (Rosenstand 2005; Singer and Singer 2005;
Paola, Walker, and Nixon 2010). Factual, fictional, bio-
graphical, and clinico-literary case depictions have
turned on conflicts of personal or public value, clashes
of moral principle and commitment, and frustrated
promises of resolution. Literature, broadly understood,
provides readers and ethicists alike with rich represen-
tations of situations finely graded by moral ambiguity
and viewpoint (MacIntyre 1981; Chambers 1996, 1999;
Widdershoven and Smits 1996), and in this sense
embodies and structures cultural encounters with notions
of right and wrong (Guroian 1998).
In the preface to his novel, What Maisie Knew
(1897), Henry James wrote that
the effort really to see and really to represent is
no idle business in face of the constant force that
makes for muddlement. The great thing is indeed
that the muddled state too is one of the very
sharpest of realities, that it also has colour and
form and character, has often in fact a broad and
rich comicality (James 1985, 30).
One way in which clinicians and ethicists respond
to moral muddlement is by extracting what appears to
be the salient elements of a situation—the medical and
moral particulars—to incorporate them as observation,
description, point of view, and components of ethical
commentary into a text, woven together with narrative
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devices to create a case. Through devices such as retro-
spective reconstruction, controlled unfolding, the use of
voice (witness, dialogue, and quotation), the develop-
ment of suspense, surprise, and temporal switches, cases
package situations in second-order formulations suppos-
edly less quirky and particular than the phenomena they
encapsulate (Holm 1997; Hurwitz 2005; Miller 1996).
Cases deposit representations of scenarios that can
be explored and interrogated “on paper” so that they
can be mused over, elaborated on, published, debated,
and analysed, a process which distracts attention away
from the lived experiences and perplexities of people
in the grip of circumstances, by interposing critical
distance between events and happenings themselves
and the events narrated. The teller of cases reorders
and reflects on situations (undertaking meaning-
making a posteriori), exposing selected elements to
the moral lens and rehearsed ethical reasonings of a
wider community. In this sense, cases are “usable
stories” (Scheiber 1979, 482), models informed by
observation, selection, and ethical theory, through
which perspective, moral deliberation, and commen-
tary can be developed (Hurwitz 2006).
Composed of tellings that have a time course, a
plot, a point, and a point of view (Charon 2006), case
description occupies a diverse linguistic register—
conversational, ethnographic, novelistic, anecdotal,
naturalistic, impersonal, literary, and biographical.
This paper claims a role for unpacking the textual form
to illuminate how style in bioethics cases relates to
authorial engagement with the moral situatedness of
its subject matter (Parker 2012).
Lauren Berlant finds cases arise wherever and
whenever problem-events animate judgements—a
symptom, a crime or a moral quandary, “any irritating
obstacle to clarity” in texts that develop a treatment of
fathomability:
When an event occurs out of which a case is
constructed it represents a situation in which
people are compelled to take its history, seek
out precedent, write its narratives, adjudicate
claims about it, make a judgment, and file it
somewhere: a sick body, a traffic accident, a
phenomenon, instance, or detail that captures
the interpretive eye. … [T]he idiom of the judg-
ment … varies tremendously across disciplines,
[and] professions: law, medicine, chat shows,
blogs, [and] each domain [has] its vernacular
(Berlant 2007, 663–672).
Case narratives manipulate temporality: The listen-
er, spectator, or reader must imagine not only the
events that “actually happened” but also the ways in
which these are arranged in a telling. “Some literary
critics call the former the ‘story’ and the latter the
‘plot.’ The plot construes the story in a certain way”
(Hurwitz, Tapping, and Vickers 2006, 487), in a dual
time-scheme arising from the difference in temporality
between the signs (on a page or in speech) carrying
meaning and the account narrated. In-and-of them-
selves, the signs making-up a narrative—its successive
words, phrases, gestures, and images—lack storied
temporality; it is in their concatenation and positioning
of chronology that the plot takes shape (Rimmon-
Kenan 2006). Hence Christian Metz’s formulation:
that narratives work “by inventing one time sequence
in terms of another time scheme” (quoted in Genette
1980, 33).
Bioethics cases constitute versatile means for report-
ing that… in various ways, voices, and emphases, allow-
ing readers to relate to… and assess whatever is going
on medically, interpersonally, psychologically, and mor-
ally. An ethics vignette reported by Chambers and
Montgomery illustrates the freedom and responsibility
exercised in the composition of cases, consideration of
which may assist in their interpretation.
Suppose a colleague approaches you and says,
“We have a patient who came for a prostatectomy,
and as he was getting prepped, the nurses noticed
that he wouldn’t talk about his family. Really odd.
Then, after the surgery, he tells us that his wife and
children—even his secretary—all think he’s away
on a business trip, and he doesn’t want us to
contact them. Now Mr. Kaufman’s bleeding, and
we just took him back to the operating room”
(Chambers and Montgomery 2002, 84).
This story, they argue, could be said to be the se-
quence of events:
(1) a man learns he needs surgery, (2) he tells his
family he is away on a business trip, (3) after the
surgery he tells the health care professionals about
the deception, (4) he suffers a bleeding com-
plication of surgery (Chambers and Montgomery
2002, 84).
The second version looks superficially similar to
the original, but it is actually structured quite differ-
ently. Version one begins with the surgery and features
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a flashback observation that prior to surgery the pa-
tient would not talk about his family. In the first way
the story is told the significance of Mr. Kaufman’s
avoidance initially goes unnoticed; it is only recog-
nised as significant retrospectively, emphasised by “he
wouldn’t talk about his family,” which gains the status
of a clue in an unfolding mystery and which causes
some perplexity to health care staff (and here we might
note that many clinical and bioethical cases are con-
structed on the template of a fathomable puzzle using
techniques that highlight something odd at the start of
a tale and, by a process of informational drip-feed,
come to generate suspense not unlike that which takes
place in detective fiction [Snyder 2004]).
As Chambers and Montgomery note, Mr. Kaufman
has undergone a surgical procedure entirely alone, with-
out the advice, support, or knowledge of family or a
network of friends or colleagues. Does he harbour a
secret (or secrets)? Is he abnormally solitary? Is it pos-
sible he wants to protect his family from worrying about
him? Does he fear impotence as a consequence of the
procedure, which he hasn’t discussed with his wife or
partner? Is he living a double life? Such questions reveal
how narratively-based are thoughts and hypotheses that
come to the fore when someone’s behaviour appears
strange or incomprehensible when explanations are
sought to impute motive and bridge gaps in knowledge
or understanding.
In the first way the story is told the account breaks
off as the patient is bleeding and being taken back to
the operating theatre, when the questions on the minds
of his health carers, readers surmise, are not only
“How serious has the situation become?”, “What’s to
be done if the bleeding complication cannot be
stopped by emergency surgery?”, and “Who, if any-
one, should be informed about it?”, but additionally,
and just as importantly, “What sort of a person is Mr.
Kaufman?”, “What are his values, in what does he
believe?”, and “What does he think he is doing?”
Answers to such questions cannot be inferred without
further biographical information, without, that is,
knowing a great deal more about Mr. Kaufman’s per-
sonal story, which might reveal information about his
life, lifestyle, character, deviousness, personality,
goals, predilections, support group, mental health, up-
bringing, relations with parents, emotional ties, and
loneliness (Hurwitz, Cushing, and Chisnall 2012).
But in the more linear way in which the story
unfolds, what seems to be at stake is rather different,
the focus revolving around a deception Mr. Kaufman
has played on his family, which deemphasises the
significance of his refusal to talk about family with
health care staff. Chambers and Montgomery com-
ment that, of the two ways in which the story has
unfolded so far, one captures the urgency and existen-
tial drama of the situation, hinting at the effects on Mr.
Kaufman’s health carers, their sense of discomfort,
puzzlement, surprise, and possible disapproval of
him: “he tells us that his wife and children—even his
secretary—all think he’s away on a business trip”
(Chambers and Montgomery 2002, 84, emphasis
added), the phrase “he tells us” indicating that Mr.
Kaufman’s reliability as a narrator may be doubted.
However, the second telling of the case, based on
more passive grammatical construction, does not in-
dex any issue about reliability, edits out the drama, and
offers no reference to the health care staff who may
well feel they are at the centre of an impending moral
quandary.
So, the two case construals of Mr. Kaufman’s situ-
ation are by no means equivalent—their situational
context and focus differ markedly. We might say that
each case models the medico-moral scenario different-
ly. In the first account, we learn of the existence of a
wife, children, and a secretary, three sets of people
with particular relationships to, and likely moral calls
on, Mr. Kaufman, which his behaviour appears to be
denying. In letting it be known he will not talk about
his family, Mr. Kaufman is clearly demonstrating
agency—operational autonomy—through which (for
unknown reasons) he appears to have spun a web of
deceit. In narrative terms, Mr. Kaufman is a character
who is hard “to read”; in health care terms, he’s a person
difficult to assess and understand. But in version two of
the telling this context is omitted, presumably on the
grounds that it is not morally salient.
Gilbert Ryle recognised that schematic descriptions
of events and actions can be morally “thin.” The
contraction of an eyelid may be an involuntary re-
sponse to dust in the air, or it may be the signal a
bidder employs to seal a contract at auction or the
conspiratorial wink adopted to tell a confederate in a
burglary to pull the trigger on an innocent victim. The
meaning discerned in descriptions of events and
actions—including moral meaning—depends critical-
ly on the context in which they are embedded: that the
twitch of an eyelid can even be an action answering to
a motive, expressing a certain desire, and not merely
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the reflexive consequence of irritation on the cornea,
depends on just such a context, knowledge of which
“thickens” the moral meaning of a situation (Ryle
1971; Geertz 1993).
Fifteen years ago Barbara Nicholas and Grant Gil-
lett made a plea for much more context in bioethics
cases, complaining that “it is too frequently invisible
within a method which seeks some sort of universal
approach” (Nicholas and Gillett 1997, 295). In telling
his family “he is away on a business trip” (version
two), Mr. Kaufman’s action is portrayed in a morally
thin way, whereas “he tells us that his wife and chil-
dren—even his secretary—all think he’s away on a
business trip” (Chambers and Montgomery 2002, 84,
emphasis added) is a much thicker description, carry-
ing more information about the scope of the deception
and the kind of problem Mr. Kaufman’s health carers
may face if he deteriorates further. The second version’s
narrator, in contrast, is anonymous and disembodied and
in no way affiliated with the health care staff responsible
for Mr. Kaufman.
It is apparent how differentially health care tellings
can highlight, place into shadow, and leave out the
morally constitutive elements of a developing scenar-
io. If the account of Mr. Kaufman’s post-operative
bleeding were to feature in an organisational narrative
about how well a hospital is (or is not) working, the
case report might dwell on the fact that in version one
the nurses, prior to surgery, did in fact notice that Mr.
Kaufman would not speak about his family, but their
observation somehow became dismissed and normal-
ised—possibly by the nurses themselves—as not note-
worthy until after the first surgery (Gabriel 2004). But
if such an account were to feature in a medico-legal
discussion about what happened, the narrator might
focus on whether omitting to enquire further, at the
pre-surgery stage, represented customary nursing
practice and whether, in the circumstances, this could
be considered reasonable; if it is not reasonable, could
failure to perceive the significance of Mr. Kaufman’s
silence amount to poor (even substandard) nursing
practice? Is the nurse’s original observation and judge-
ment revealed by the remark “really odd” (Chambers
and Montgomery 2002, 84, emphasis added) docu-
mented in the nursing notes? And, if so, should it have
been followed up? If not, why not? Or did “really odd”
actually emanate from an interpolation of an authorial
point of view into the telling of the case? We see here
how one set of events—what happened when Mr.
Kaufman underwent prostatic surgery—can be emplot-
ted in a number of different ways depending on the
purposes of recounting them (Hurwitz, Cushing, and
Chisnall 2012; Mattingly 1998).
Narrative considered as discourse and discursive
performance offers enormous scope for strategy and
ingenuity in just how what is being narrated is con-
structed and conveyed, orally, gesturally, and as text.
The framing and narration of a case—not only which
elements are emphasised and which omitted but its
narrative structuring—speaks in important ways to
the purpose animating its telling and carries implications
for how it is to be read and interpreted. It is not just a
question of content, though that is critical, but of the
shaping, accenting, and structuring of informational
content (Hurwitz, Cushing, and Chisnall 2012). As with
the case ofMr. Kaufman, the plot’s construal needs to be
read in part as the outcome of narratorial choices. Build-
ing the case and composing its narrative are features of
bioethics cases that deserve as much attention as does
case analysis, where case qua model or construct is
often treated as a given.
However, cases are not in any meaningful sense
“given”; rather, they are narrative construals of obser-
vations and ways of thinking-through representations.
They are not photo-mechanical reproductions of
scenes on a stage but artifices of theory-informed
thought, albeit frequently rendered in depersonalised,
“naturalistic” language that mimics the medical liter-
atures of fact (Chambers 1996, 1999). Chambers has
argued for the absence of privileged and innocent
compositions of ethical problems and has urged that
what is required for their analysis is a sophisticated
response to the “constructedness” of their composi-
tion, which often “makes readers see another’s way of
seeing as natural and self-evident” when it may not be
(Chambers 1999, 25–30).
Martin classifies case descriptions by the schema to
which they approximate (Martin 2008): A running com-
mentary on a problem that never develops to a critical
nub he terms a “recount”; whereas an “exemplum”
explicates a noteworthy incident and encourages moral
judgement on the part of the reader; and an “anecdote”
develops a scenario that disrupts in some way the read-
er’s expectation, encouraging an act of sympathy or
identification with a character or action, such as “there
but for the grace of God go I.”
Some case genres are better suited to delineating
complex moral issues than others, at accommodating
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in-depth development and exploration of a scenario,
and in evoking reader responses. Identifying the genre
in which a case is written goes some way to indicating
how it is constructed and to pinpointing how it works
on readers. A case published by the British Journal of
General Practice in 2006 is clearly an exemplum in
Martin’s sense, one in which it is the reader’s response
that actually supplies the moral closure to the story:
Mrs B was 84 years old, when her General
Practitioner, who had known her for a decade
and a half, was asked to see her. Mrs B had been
widowed for 5 years, following the sudden death
of her husband, Jack. Her two sons had been a
disappointment to her: both were in and out of
prison for repeated minor criminal offences. The
practice nurse had asked the doctor to see her,
after looking at her blood test results. Below we
show Mrs B’s multiple and compounding con-
ditions, and the results of her most recent tests,
which sparked the consultation.
Mrs B’s diagnoses Lab test results
Diabetes HbA1c 9.7 %
Hypertension BP 180/96
Osteoarthritis BMI 29
Macular degeneration Cholesterol 8 mmol/L
Depression
The doctor rehearsed with Mrs B the abundant
evidence supporting interventions to improve all
her biochemical parameters. There was evidence,
the doctor said confidently, to support changes in
her lifestyle.Mrs B listened carefully to the doctor,
and then remained quiet for a moment. After a
while, she spoke. “Well”, she said, “Jack’s dead,
and the boys have gone” (Sweeney and Heath
2006, 386).
The most prominent aspect of this report, which
somewhat curiously is laid-out in the format of a
medical record, is the way it suddenly comes to an
abrupt halt, just as it transpires that patient and doctor
inhabit worlds of radically different concerns and val-
ues. The “abundant” evidence (and confidence) with
which we expect the doctor to assess Mrs. B takes on a
new complexion as a result of the words she utters.
What Mrs. B says (and the way that she speaks) makes
clear that all the medical evidence in the world is of no
significance to her, because she has quite different
things on her mind, the tone, tense, and terseness of
her utterance lending pungency and poignancy to her
words. Perhaps what jars the most in the reading of
this case is the glimpse it provides into Mrs. B’s inner
world, the intensity of her distress and sadness, which
breaks out on an otherwise apparently tranquil consul-
tation, the story ending quite abruptly “in mid-air.”
What Mrs. B most needs, readers will surmise, is a
doctor who is not totally in thrall to bio-variables, one
who can switch his or her attention to just how lonely
and hopeless this widow feels, a response which acts
as the moral closure to the case (Hurwitz, Cushing,
and Chisnall 2012).
The way cases work requires unpacking within the
parameters of their adopted composition and stylistic
convention. A common strategy is for a case to mas-
querade as a mirror image of a situation under scrutiny:
AIDS and a Duty to Protect
Mr B, age twenty-eight, reported to the commu-
nity health center of a large city teaching hospital
after being confidentially informed that his
blood test was positive for antibodies to HIV,
the virus that causes AIDS. The patient had no
symptoms.
Dr T informed Mr B that although he did not
have AIDS, there was between a five and thirty-
five percent probability that he would develop
the disease within the next five years. He was
told that he could probably infect others through
sexual contact, by sharing needles, or by donating
blood and blood products. He was counselled not
to donate blood, and to engage in “safe sex”, that
is, sex that does not involve the exchange of
bodily fluids such as semen.
Mr B then revealed that he is bisexual, and that
he believed that he had contracted the infection
during one of his homosexual encounters. He
also said that he was engaged. Dr T advised
him to inform his fiancée of his diagnosis. But
Mr B refused to do so, saying that it would ruin
his marriage plans.
Should Mr T inform the fiancée of Mr B’s test
results, or should he protect the confidentiality of
the therapeutic relationship? (Crigger 1998, 43).
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The impersonal register here is very striking: Ren-
dered in a thoroughly disinterested style, this case
unfolds in a linear manner, offering no reference at all
to human interiority—voice, feeling, the personality of
patient or doctor. It is therefore not possible to begin to
explain the patient’s adamant refusal to inform his fian-
cée of his HIV status. This way of writing removes the
subjective reality of difficulties faced by the dramatis
personae of a case: whatMr. Bmay feel, how he reasons,
and how the doctor intends to respond to his point-blank
refusal. We learn nothing of the doctor’s appreciation of
Mr. B’s sense of moral and personal responsibility: Is Dr.
T considering whether B is scared on his own behalf, or
is he more afraid that his fiancée will break off the
engagement when she hears about the HIV status or
about his bisexuality? And does Dr. T have any inkling
of how Mr. B responded on first hearing of his HIV test
result? Does the doctor appreciate that people need time,
space, and opportunities to converse with others in order
to come to terms with news of this import? At what
point should Dr. T try to explore Mr. B’s conscience
concerning his feelings for—not only his moral re-
sponsibility toward—his fiancée? About these interac-
tional issues that carry muchmoral import the account is
silent. If ethical and clinical progress is to be made in
this scenario, some situated plan needs to be developed
that can point toward a negotiated way forward, but
there is no indication in the case that this could be
attempted. These aspects of the situation are not the
focus of the report, which instead confronts the reader
with a clash of moral obligations, prefigured in a title
strongly suggesting which one should triumph.
Clinico-ethical case descriptions neither match tran-
scriptions of medical records nor the way health carers
talk to patients, and although many medico-moral cases
arise out of networks of human relations, the way they are
written-up often occludes these interpersonal origins in
favour of attempts to subsume the issues they raise under
a discussion of universalist ethics, rather than within a
more situated form of deliberation (Parker 2012). This
has led some ethnographers and social scientists to pro-
pose that more empirical, anthropological, and participant
observer methods be adopted to ensure bioethics cases
and considerations are based upon validly collected data
that authentically represent the local networks from
which these texts arise (Kleinman 1997, 1999).
This paper has argued that understanding medico-
ethical case reports can be enhanced by greater attention
to their construction as models of health care events and
happenings. Peter and Renata Singer, in an anthology of
ethics entitled The Moral of the Story (2005), argue that
literary accounts invoke layered depths of detail, moral
ambiguity, richly nuanced characters, and circumstances
that are recognised by ethical analysis of such works.
Martha Nussbaum has noted something similar: that the
language of philosophical cases often lacks the particu-
larity, emotive appeal, and absorbing emplottedness of a
good story—“fiction’s way of making the reader a par-
ticipant and a friend”—that how tales are couched pro-
vokes different ethical responses and interpretations
(Nussbaum 1990, 19 and 46).
Case writings influence readers through structure
and affect as well as contents. In the clinic, techni-
ques of “attentive listening” seek to take account of
the shape and tone of consultations—the word order
used, emotional intonation, pauses, and how silence
and non-verbal utterances are deployed—in attempts
to understand what is being communicated (von
Fragstein et al. 2008). Close readings of texts, of
the sort sketched out here, draw attention to the craft
of case construction and the sorts of insights that can
accrue from examining structure, effects on readers,
and the textual practices that take place within the
envelope of bioethics cases.
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